Maine: GOP surges, not in Congressional election
Maine’s 1st Congressional District offered one of the few Democratic victories on the night of November 2, 2010. The race between Democrat incumbent Chellie Pingree and Tea-party endorsed Republican challenger Dean Scontras removed itself from the national--and Maine--voting trends. The contrary election results supported the notion that voters from Maine support the candidate rather than the national discourse. As Paul S. Herrnson says in Congressional Elections, “Congressional elections are affected by perceptions of the performance of government” (Herrnson 1). While much of the country saw Republicans as change for an ill-perceived legislator, Maine granted Pingree a positive perception of her first two years as a United States Representative.
Maine’s 1st District includes the counties of Cumberland, Kennebec, Knox, Lincoln, Sagadahoc, and York. Its demographics remain on par with United States averages, except for race and ethnicity breakdown according to the New York Times’ District profile. The 1st District has a 95% white population opposed to the United States’ 65.9%, a 1.1% black population opposed to 12.1% on the national scale, and a 1.4% hispanic population opposed to 15.1%. The $53,324 median income of District 1 nearly mirrors the U.S.’ median of $52,175. In addition, the 65 and older population comes in just 2% higher than the U.S.’ 12.6% (Maine Profile 1). Appealing to the white middle-class worker, and elderly population is key based on the demographical date provided.
In terms of the 675 Republican gains in state legislators, Maine followed suit giving both the State House and Senate to the Republicans (Baiz 1). As Herrnson says, with the impatience of a slowly rebounding economy, “The president’s party has historically lost congressional seats in midterm elections when economic trends are unfavorable...” (Herrnson 25). Taking advantage of the impatience, the GOP gained 60 seats in the U.S. House. In conjunction, Republicans have control of Maine’s capital Augusta for the first time since 1970; Republican governor-elect Paul LePage provides his party with both the Blaine House and Maine legislator for the first time since 1960 (Robinson1). However, the success by the Republican candidates in both the state legislative and gubernatorial races failed to coordinate with the U.S. House races. This failure by the GOP in Maine comes with a history of Mainers voting against the tide of massive congressional power shifts.
Pingree defeated Scontras in 2010’s election by a 166,196 (55%) to 126,218 (43%) count (Races 1). In 2008, Republican Senator Susan Collins shared similar success despite a large wave of support for Democrats. In congressional District 1, Collins received 234,708 (59%) votes to Democrat Tom Allen’s 165,220 (52%). Collins success in this district underlines why she won 444,300 to 279,510. District 1 backs Democrats more often than not and by large margins. Scontras’ 43% of the vote in 2010 compared to Collins’ 59% in 2008 expresses a difference of 16%; meaning that a significant number of Democrats voted for Collins in 2008, but did not vote for Scontras in 2010. While 107,514 less voters contributed to the tallies in the 2010 election, it cannot be easily assumed that these are Collin supporters who stayed home (Election Results).
Furthermore, data associated to the 1994 mid-term elections, a more microscopic look at the 2008 election, and 2010 elections exemplify Maine voters shying away from the voting trends of the election cycle. Using Maine’s largest city Portland as a measure of Democratic success, because of the city’s tendency to share more liberal values, hence their 73% support for gay marriage (the highest in the state during 2008 referendum that failed according to Maine.gov), the misuse of Maine as ‘strictly liberal’ is exposed.
Portland has eight state legislative districts, and in 2008 all eight were secured by Democrats. In Portland District 117, Democrat Ann Haskell defeated Republican Philip Haskell with 75% of the vote. In District 118, Democrat Jon Hinck defeated Republican Joshua Miller with 74% of the vote. In District 119, Democrat Herbert Adams defeated Republican Ryan Hendrickson with 87% of the vote. In District 114, Democrat Peter Stuckey defeated Republican David Fernald with 72% of the vote, and similar percentiles followed in the remaining three districts (Election Results). As seen, the Democratic victories in Portland’s eight districts were won handily; keeping in mind this matches the Democratic surge across the country. On the other hand, 2010 illustrated some changes in Portland; District 116 gave Democrat Denise Harlow the victory by 56% of the vote. In District 115, Democrat Steve Lovejoy won by 54% of the vote, and in District 119, Democrat Jill Barkley lost with 46% of the vote (Election Results). With the margins of victory for Democrats slimming in 2010, Portland supported seven of the eight Democratic candidates.With this said, one would expect a lack of success for Pingree in Portland. Without available data of city-by-city voting results, Cumberland county (which Portland’s population is the majority of) gave Pingree 59% of their vote in 2010 (Maine Votes ). While in 2008, Pingree, running against Republican Charlie Summers, received 56% of Cumberland’s vote (Election Results). The percentiles run closely to one another, but the sheer fact that Pingree received more support from the Portland region in 2010 than in 2008 provides further indication that Maine only adopts certain national trends in its voting.
Additional comparisons can be made from the 1994 election that was later labeled the “Republican Revolution.” Herrnson refers to the causes of political power shifts; “Hostile sentiments directed at congressional Democrats and President Bill Clinton led to the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994. Disapproval of the performance of President Bush, congressional Republicans, and the war in Iraq helped the Democrats reclaim... 12 years later” (Herrnson 21). In spite of the “hostile sentiments,” Maine’s 1994 congressional races were not easily handed to Republicans. In 1994’s District 1 House race Republican Jim Longley won 52% to Democrat Dennis Dutremble’s 48% (Election Results). Yet, in District 2’s House race Democrat John Baldacci won 45.7% to Republican Richard Bennett’s 40.7%. And in the gubernatorial race, Republican candidate Susan Collins received a mere 23.1% of the vote while Independent Angus King defeated Democrat James Brennen 35.4% to 33.8%. The New York Times said of the election, “Everyone who follows politics in this unpredictable state has been somewhat surprised by the turn of events...” (Rosenbaum 1). The “unpredictable” state continues the practice of this sort of voting behavior. During the congressional election in 2010, Mainers voted in a comparable manner for governor. Democrat Libby Mitchell received only 19% of the vote, and Republican Paul LePage eked out a 38% to 37% victory over Independent Eliot Cutler (Races 1). Again, it is reiterated that Pingree managed a handsome victory for reelection despite Democratic control exchanged to Republicans in almost every other aspect.
As to why Pingree surfaces as a victorious candidate among Democratic agony, one can look at the several factors that contributed to her successful campaign for reelection. First and foremost, she was the incumbent candidate. Although incumbents were not popular in 2010, Herrnson says, “Even during the tidal wave elections of 1994 and 2006, more than 90 percent of all House members and and 85 percent of all senators who sought to remain in office were able to do so...” (Herrnson 22).
Secondly, media coverage and other communications focused their attention on the gubernatorial race; LePage garnered the majority of election coverage with his shrewd remarks and controversial property tax history. In regards to this ‘under the radar’ election, Herrnson says, “In the absence of spirited, high-intensity elections, most voters use “voting cues”--shortcuts that enable them to cast a ballot without engaging in a lengthy decision-making process. The most frequently used voting cue is incumbency” (Herrnson 198). With minimal attraction to the race in the overall arena, voters tend to vote uninformed; for instance, Herrnson says, “in an open-seat House contest, about 37 percent of all voters can remember both candidates’ names” (Herrnson 197). Pingree had two key components for gathering votes: the voting of incumbency and presumably name recognition.
Although Herrnson says, “The negative news stories generated by scandal or an association with scandal can put a campaign on the defensive and prevent it from communicating the candidate’s message for the remainder of the race,” a private-jet scandal may have benefited Pingree (Herrnson 238). Scontras’ campaign produced claims that Pingree dejected House Ethics Committee’s rules by flying on a corporate jet owned by her fiance. In response, as the Bangor Daily News reports, “She quelled the furor by producing a letter from the House Ethics Committee saying the fights were acceptable...” (Curtis 1). However, Scontras made it a focal issue of his campaign while Pingree moved forward to press home the ‘issues.’ In this case, Herrnson’s point regarding scandal distracted the innocent (Scontras) rather than the one (Pingree) accused of scandal.
Next, the notion that most elections see two candidates with polar stances on issues was not entirely true in the District 1 race this November. Herrnson says, “When both candidates campaign mainly on valence issues, the dialogue can be like a debate between the nearly identical Tweedledee and Tweedledum. That would be unusual, as most candidates select policy positions associated with their party and so are on opposing sides on most issues” (Herrnson 212). While both candidates had definable differences in values, Scontras moved towards the middle during a year when uniform conservatives were preferable. In fact, it is interesting that the Tea-party advocated for Scontras given his more moderate stances on issues compared to his 2008 Republican primary race for District 1 U.S. Rep. In a comparison of debates, Scontras answers in 2008 that he is the only ‘pro-life’ candidate, for a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage, and for off-shore drilling. In 2010, Scontras says that the right to have an abortion has been upheld by the Supreme Court, gay marriage should be decided by the states, and he is flat-out not in favor of off-shore drilling (The Real Dean Scontras 1). Unlike LePage (also a Tea-party backed candidate) who stood by off-shore drilling and pro-life stances and received victory, Scontras distanced himself from what he believe hindered his 2008 bid for office.
Lastly, money like all democratic campaigns proved to be an important factor. Especially for Pingree, as Herrnson says, “A typical incumbent’s campaign--one waged by a candidate who faces stiff competition in neither the primary nor the general election--will generally engage in heavy fundraising early and then allow this activity to taper off as it becomes clear that the candidate is not in jeopardy” (Hernnson 178). Both candidates saved money through having no primary opponents, and this led to Pingree out-raising and out-spending Scontras. She raised $1,013,040 and spent $732,501; Scontras raised $361,166 and spent $305,970 (Maine Profile 1). $345,650 alone was raised via contributions from Pingree’s Web site (Maine Profile 1).
All in all, Pingree managed survival during an election cycle filled with angst and impatience for the promised ‘changed.’ In this midst of the second-coming of the ‘Republican Revolution,’ Mainers sent a Democrat back to Washington and gave the GOP control of the state for this first time since 1960. The repercussions of Republican control aligns with what Herrnson says tends to happen under such condition, “Uncompetitive House districts are often the product of a highly political redistricting process. In states where one party controls both governorship and the state legislator, partisan gerrymandering is often used to maximize the number of House seats the dominant party can win” (Herrnson 23). Time will tell whether or not Maine faces redistricting to benefit future GOP candidates, and if Pingree can again receive another stint in Washington.
Works Cited
Baiz, Dan. "The Republican Takeover in the States." Washington Post. 14 Nov. 2010. Web. 16 Nov. 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 2010/11/13/AR2010111304276.html
Curtis, Abigail. "1st District Voters Return Pingree to U.S. House Seat." Bangor Daily News. 02 Nov. 2010. Web. 16 Nov. 2010. http://new.bangordailynews.com/ 2010/11/02/ politics/1st-district-house-hopefuls-see-race-get-tighter/.
"Election Results." Maine.gov. Web. 16 Nov. 2010.
Hand, By. "Maine Vote." Bangor Daily News. Web. 16 Nov. 2010.
Herrnson, Paul S. Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington. Washington, D.C.: CQ, 2008. Print.
"Maine Profile." The New York Times. 16 Nov. 2010. Web. 16 Nov. 2010.
"Races." The Portland Press Herald. Web. 16 Nov. 2010.
"The Real Dean Scontras." Chellie Pingree for Congress. Web. 16 Nov. 2010.
Robinson, Steve. "Can a Republican Revolution save the State of Maine?" The Bowdoin Orient. 12 Nov. 2010. Web. 16 Nov. 2010.
Rosenbaum, David. "THE 1994 CAMPAIGN: MAINE; In an Unpredictable State, the Senate Race Appears Predictable - New York Times." The New York Times. 29 Oct. 1994. Web. 16 Nov. 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/29/us/1994-campaign-maine-unpredictable-state-senate-race-appears-predictable.html.
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